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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the dissent's reference to National Bellas Hess' presumably necessary utiliza-
tion of banking, credit and collection institutions in Illinois to determine the
financial circumstances of its Illinois customers who order goods on credit
plans.44 When considered in addition to the fact of regular solicitation by mail
of sales in the consumer market, the seller's use of local banking and credit
institutions may provide the required nexus to sustain the state's imposition of
use tax obligations. Such a practical approach to the facts of mail-order busi-
ness would offer the Court reasonable grounds for disfinguishing National
Bellas Hess and for reestablishing the reasoning and. emphasis of prior use
tax cases.
DAVID J. LEVENSON
Insurance—Insolvency--General Agent's Right to Set Off Unearned
Premiums.—Korlanu v. E-Z Pay Plan, Inc. 1—Manhattan Agencies, Inc.
was a general agent which wrote automobile policies on young or "rated"
drivers for Superior Mutual Insurance Company and other insurance com-
panies. After a time of consistent dealing with each other, Superior encoun-
tered financial difficulties and was declared insolvent. As a result, all policies
written for Superior were cancelled. Subsequent to a notice of Superior's
insolvency, Manhattan, instead of remitting to the receiver in bankruptcy
the full amount of the premiums collected on behalf of Superior, returned
that portion of the premiums which became unearned because of the cancel-
lation to E-Z Pay Plan, Inc., as assignee of the policies. E-Z Pay was a
finance company which discounted the time payment contracts of Manhat-
tan's customers. On the theory that Manhattan was a trustee for both earned
and unearned premiums received from policyholders and, therefore, bound
to pay all receipts to Superior's receiver upon notice of Superior's insolvency,
an order was directed to Manhattan and E-Z Pay to show cause why Man-
hattan should not be adjudged to be indebted to Superior for the amount of
the unearned premiums and why both Manhattan and E-Z Pay should not
be held in contempt for a violation of the liquidation order.
The trial court found that Manhattan was a trustee of both the earned
and unearned premiums and that Manhattan was, therefore, a converter of
the money returned to E-Z Pay, and E-Z Pay a constructive trustee of the
refund for the benefit of Superior's receiver. On appeal by Manhattan and
E-Z Pay,. the Supreme Court of Oregon HELD: The business conduct of
Manhattan and Superior over the years clearly indicates that they were at
all times dealing with each other as mutual debtor and creditor, and not as
44 Bellas Hess could not carry on its business in Illinois, and particularly its
substantial credit business, without utilizing Illinois banking and credit facilities.
[Ilt would ... be unreasonable to assume that the company does not either
sell or assign its accounts or otherwise take measures to collect its delinquent
accounts, or that collection does not include local activities by the company or its
assignees or representatives.
386 U.S. at 762.
1 428 P.2d 172 (Ore. 1967).
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trustee and beneficiary, so that Manhattan, as both debtor and creditor of
Superior in its own right, was free to set off the unearned premiums following
notice of Superior's insolvency and to return them to E-Z Pay. 2
A determination as to whether Manhattan and Superior were trustee
and beneficiary or debtor and creditor is of threshold importance because
it is well established that one holding money for another as trustee may not
set off and retain this money to reduce a debt owed to him personally by
the beneficiary of the trust.3 If, then, Manhattan held the premiums as
trustee for Superior, it was obligated to remit the entire sum, both earned
and unearned premiums, to Superior even though Superior's insolvency re-
sulted in a cancellation of all its policies. Ordinarily, a cancellation would
entitle Manhattan to the unearned premiums for the benefit of its customers.
On the other hand, a determination that Manhattan and Superior were
debtor and creditor would logically demand at least consideration of the
further issue—whether, in the discretion of the court, the setoff by Manhattan
of the unearned premiums should be permitted to stand. 4
According to authorities, the manifested intention of the parties should
be the determining factor in defining Manhattan and Superior's relationship. 6
There was, however, no express agreement between them defining their sta-
tus, nor did Oregon have a statute to aid in interpretation. It was, therefore,
incumbent upon the court to look to their established business practices in
the light of general principles of insurance practice.
In pursuance of this task, the majority seems to have placed undeserved
reliance on at least one aspect of Manhattan and Superior's business prac-
tices in reaching its conclusion that they stood in the relationship of debtor
and creditor. According to their arrangement for settling accounts, Manhat-
tan was given 70 days after the issuance of a policy to turn over to Superior
the premiums due. Its obligation at the end of that time was only for the
net premium, so that whenever a policy was cancelled during the regular
course of business, Manhattan would credit Superior with the amount of the
refund and then pay over to E-Z Pay the unearned premium. No money
would move from Superior to Manhattan, but their accounts would show
that the refund had reduced the amount due Superior from Manhattan. The
majority's emphasis of this accounting practice suggests that it relied on it
to some extent to show that Manhattan was entitled to set off unearned
premiums after the insolvency of Superiors Since a setoff in bankruptcy is
permitted only between mutual debtors and creditors, 7 implicit in such rea-
soning is the determination that this practice reflects such a debtor-creditor
relationship. Although it is not clear, perhaps such a determination was
2 Id. at 175-76.
Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App. 2d 323, 331, 227 P.2d 484, 490 (1951);
Charles W. Virgin Ins. Agency v. Alabama Gen. Ins. Co., 114 So. 2d 524, 525 (Dist.
Ct. App. Fla. 1959).
4 Bankruptcy Act § 68, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1964) provides for a setoff
of mutual debts and credits.
5 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 12, comment g (1959); 1 A. Scott, Trusts § 12.2
(2d ed. 1956).
6 428 P.2d at 174-76.
7 See Bankruptcy Act § 68, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
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reached because Manhattan's control over these unearned premiums indi-
cated to the majority a degree of independence and responsibility which was
inconsistent with the concept of a controlled fiduciary. 8
The dissent criticized the majority's apparent reliance on this offset by
adopting a part of Judge Fuld's dissenting opinion in Bohlinger v. Zanger?
In that opinion Judge Fuld pointed out that when the insurer is still solvent
the return of unearned premiums made by an agent upon cancellation of a
policy need not be considered anything more than a convenient and expedient
way of adjusting the respective interests of the insurer and the policyholders
in the collected premiums. 1° According to this reasoning, a solvent Superior
would be obligated to return the unearned premiums to the policyholders
anyway, so that effecting this result by allowing Manhattan to return the
premium can be explained as merely avoiding the useless circuity of requir-
ing Manhattan to remit the unearned premiums to Superior before they are
returned to the policyholders. Judge Fuld's point, then, is that this practice
by itself indicates neither one way nor the other what relationship existed
between parties like Manhattan and Superior because this offset could be
utilized in either a debtor-creditor or trustee-beneficiary situation as a con-
venient way of settling accounts?' The analysis is sound; consequently, a
practice which can shed no light on the actual relationship of the parties can
obviously be of no aid in determining whether Manhattan had a right to
a setoff upon a declaration of Superior's insolvency.
The dissent, however, is also guilty of extending principles beyond their
effective scope. It maintained that the generally stated principle that premiums
paid to an insurance agent constitute a payment to the insurer, and the
principle that an agent with authority to collect premiums is ordinarily con-
sidered to hold such premiums as a fiduciary for his principal, the insurer,
compel a finding that Manhattan held the premiums as a trustee or fiduciary
of Superior. The obvious purpose for the principle that payment to the agent
is payment to the insurer is, however, to protect the policyholder in the
event that the agent does not remit the collected premiums to the company. 12
It does not demand a finding that Manhattan was trustee of the premiums.
This principle would still apply whether Manhattan were a representative
of Superior to collect the premiums under a contractual duty only to remit
a like sum of money at some later date or whether Manhattan were a trustee
of the collected premiums. Under either arrangement the policyholder should
be protected.
The fact that an agent collecting premiums is ordinarily considered to
hold such premiums in trust for his principal, the insurer, is a generalization
describing the natural result to be drawn from situations where an agent is
8 See Bushnell v. Krafft, 133 Ind. App. 474, 485, 183 N.E.2d 340, 346 (1962).
° 306 N.Y. 228, 235, 117 N.E.2d 338, 341 (1954).
10 Id. at 240-41, 117 N.E.2d at 344-45; see 39 Minn. L. Rev. 787, 789 (1955).
11 See Bohlinger v. Zanger, 306 N.Y. at 240-41, 117 N.E.2d at 344 45; 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 638, 640 (1954).
12 Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Atlas Assurance Co., 278 Pa. 558, 123 A. 497 (1924);
Conniff v. Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 183 Wash. 496, 48 P.2d 946 (1935); 39 Minn.
L. Rev. 787, 788-89 (1955).
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authorized to collect money for his principal and is not permitted to treat
the collections as his own. 13 In such situations it must be assumed that a
trustee-beneficiary relationship is intended. The inference, however, from
Bohlinger v. Ward & Co.,14 a case referred to by the dissent, is that the
principle has no application where a contrary intention is indicated. In an
attempt to explain the Bohlinger court's reasons for affirming the finding
of a trustee-beneficiary relationship when faced with a similar problem of
determining the relationship between agent and insurer, Justice Brennan
stated that the case in controversy was not one where " 'the court is able to
say that the parties intended [the agent] to have the unrestricted use of the
premium I in the carrying on of its ordinary business and to be liable only
to pay a similar amount to the [company].' "19
There are two aspects of Manhattan and Superior's business practices
which indicate that Manhattan was permitted to treat the collected premiums
as its own and therefore should be regarded as a debtor of Superior rather
than its trustee. In the instant case, Manhattan was not required to keep
premiums collected for Superior in a separate bank account, but rather, with
the knowledge and apparent consent of Superior, deposited them in its own
general business account from which payment of all Manhattan's obligations
was made, including those for operating expenses." Such treatment of pre-
miums does not coincide with the usual concept of a trustee-beneficiary
relationship, but on the contrary, would seem to clearly illustrate what is
meant by an "unrestricted use of the premiums in the carrying on of its
ordinary business." 17
The arrangement whereby Superior could look to Manhattan for full pay-
ment of premiums on policies, whether they were collected or not,ls is the
other aspect of their business practices which indicates that Manhattan was
holding the money as its own. Usually an insurance agent is responsible only
for those premiums he actually collects from the policyholders.'" Manhattan's
obligation to pay the premiums, whether collected or not, amounts to an ex-
tension of its own credit. This would indicate a degree of responsibility and
independence consistent with the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship. 2°
In referring to a situation where an agent had assumed the obligation to pay
premiums 60 days after the issuance of a policy, whether they were collected
13 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 12, comment h (1959) ; 1 A. Scott, supra note 5,
at 109. Cf. Boss v. Hardee, 103 F.2d 751, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
14 20 N.J. 331, 120 A.2d 1 (1956).
15 Id. at 335-36, 120 A.2d at 3 (brackets by Justice Brennan).
16 Brief for Appellant at 18, 428 P.2d 172 (Ore. 1967).
17 See also Boss v. Hardee, 103 F.2d at 754; Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal.
App. 2d at 332, 227 P.2d at 490; cf. Brown v. Christman, 126 F.2d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir.
1942). Contra, Garrison v. Edward Brown & Sons, 25 Cal. 2d 473, 154 P.2d 377 (1944);
Manufacturers' Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mink, 129 N.J.L. 575, 30 A.2d 510 (1943).
18 Brief for Appellant at 16-17, 428 P.2d 172 (Ore. 1967).
19 Bushnell v. Krafft, 133 Ind. App. at 483, 183 N.E.2d at 345; see Elowe v. Superior
Fire Ins. Co., 307 III. App. 569, 30 N.E.2d 953 (1940).
20 See Horton v. Eagle Indem. Ins. Co., 86 N.H. 472, 171 A. 322 (1934) ; Waters v.
Wandless, 35 S.W. 184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896); Lamb v. Connor, 84 Wash, 121, 146
P. 174 (1915). Contra, In re Mason Co., 254 F. 164 (D. Conn. 1918); In re Chandler
Ins. Agency, 92 F, Supp. 878 (D. Md. 1950).
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or not, and where the companies he dealt with looked to him solely for pay-
ment, the court in Boss v. Hardee, 21 stated:
In our opinion the manifest intention of the parties shown by this
course of dealing , was to establish the relationship of debtor and
creditor. Both parties indubitably understood that when premiums
were collected appellants [agent] were to have the use of the-money
in their business for the allowed credit period of 60 days. An under-
standing of this nature does not create a trust. 22
In Korlann, the dissent maintained that, like the setoff during the regu-
lar course of business, the arrangement whereby Manhattan was permitted
to deposit the collected premiums in its general business account and whereby
Superior could look to Manhattan for payment, whether the premiums were
collected or not, can also be explained in terms of convenience and is there-
fore of no aid in assessing the relationship of the parties. Such an explanation
is not acceptable. It has been recognized that the deciding factor in assessing
what relationship existed beween Manhattan and Superior was whether Man-
hattan was permitted to treat the premiums as its own. It has already been
shown that the debtor-creditor relationship will be favored where the
practices which the dissent discounted are present. In the absence of a
statute or agreement, it would be very difficult to imagine stronger evidence
indicating an affirmative answer. To adopt the dissent's explanation, there-
fore, would seem in effect to admit the prior existence of a presumption of
a trustee-beneficiary relationship when one does not exist." An examination '
of the principal cases cited in support of this explanation reveals the source
of the dissent's error. In each of these cases there was either an express
agreement between the parties making the agent a fiduciary or a statute
creating a presumption to the same effect. 24 The issue in these cases was
whether the actual practices of the parties were sufficient to overcome the
presumption of a fiduciary relationship. In these cases, evidence of complete
inconsistency with the presumption was seemingly demanded by the courts to
change the expected result. 25 In the present case, however, there is no statute
or express agreement between Manhattan and Superior which would create
such a presumption and, therefore, Manhattan should not be compelled to
meet the same standard of proof. 26
The result of this analysis, then, is that in the absence of an express
agreement between Manhattan and Superior making Manhattan a fiduciary
21 103 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
22 Id. at 753-54.
23 See pp. 208-09 supra.
24 Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Green, 176 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1949) (statute);
Garrison v. Edward Brown & Sons, 25 Cal. 2d 473, 154 P.2d 377 (1944) (express agree-
ment); Bohlinger v. Ward & Co., 20 N.J. 331, 120 A.2d 1 (1956) (express agreement).
25 Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Green, 176 F.2d at 534-35; Garrison v. Edward
Brown & Sons, 25 Cal. 2d at 479, 154 P.2d at 380; Bohlinger v. Ward & Co., 20 N.J. at
335, 120 A.2d at 3.
20 In Bushnell v. Krafft, 133 Ind. App. 474, 183 N.E.2d 340 (1962), the court held
that evidence similar to that in this case was sufficient even to overcome the presumption
of a fiduciary relationship created by express agreement.
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or a statute creating a presumption to the same effect, an arrangement which
permits Manhattan to deposit premiums in its own general business account
and Superior to look to Manhattan for payment of the entire premium,
whether collected or not, provides ample justification for the majority's sub-
stitution of a finding that a debtor-creditor relationship was intended rather
than the relationship of trustee-beneficiary.
The finding of a debtor-creditor relationship between Manhattan and
Superior raises the issue whether Manhattan should be allowed a setoff. In
deciding previous setoff questions, the Oregon Supreme Court has looked to
Section 68(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 27 Section 68(a) reads: "In all cases
of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a
creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against the
other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid." 28 The only issue of
mutuality presented by this case was whether Manhattan and Superior stood
in the same capacity.22 This issue was settled in the affirmative by the find-
ing that Manhattan was both debtor and creditor of Superior in its own
rights° If only literal compliance were demanded, there would seem to be
no question that Manhattan should be allowed the setoff. Despite the unam-
biguous language of section 68 (a), however, a setoff is permissive rather
than mandatory and the allowance of a setoff rests with the discretion of the
court, sitting as a court of equity.21 In assessing a court's role where section
68(a) is invoked, the United States Supreme Court in Cumberland Glass
Mfg. Co. v. De Witt & Co.,32 stated that the "court has the primary duty
of determining for itself whether there are 'mutual debts or credits' that
should be set off one against the other according to the true intent and
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act." 33
The dissent's position was that even with the finding of a debtor-creditor
relationship a setoff should not be allowed in this case because it would be
inequitable and in conflict with the aim of the Bankruptcy Act which is to
effect equality of treatment for all creditors.34 It is dear that if there were
no setoff, all policyholders would become general creditors of Superior and
entitled to a share of the liquidated assets proportionate to the extent of
their claims. A setoff, however, would mean that the claims of some policy-
holders would be satisfied in full at the expense of others whose distributive
27 See, e.g., Paul B. Emerick Co. v. Wm. Bohnenkamp & Assoc., 242 Ore. 253, 409
P.2d 332 (1965).
28 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1964).
23 For a thorough discussion of the mutuality problem, see 4 W. Collier, Bankruptcy
ff 68.04[2.1] (14th ed. 1964).
38 If Manhattan had held the premiums as trustee for Superior it could not have
set them off against a debt owed to it by Superior; for the parties would have stood in
different capacities and the requisite mutuality would have been lacking. 3 H. Remington,
Bankruptcy 1451 (rev. ed. 1957).
31 Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt & Co., 237 U.S. 447, 455 (1915); accord,
In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 103 F.2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1939); Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Nelson, 101 F.2d 441, 443 (6th Cir. 1939).
32 237 U.S. 447 (1915).
33 Id. at 457.
34 See 3 W. Collier, supra note 29, II 60.01, at 743.
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share would be diminished as a result of the reduction in assets. The dissent
argued that such a preference should not be enjoyed by some policyholders
merely because of the fortuitous circumstance that they dealt with an agency
which had not remitted premiums prior to the insurer's insolvency. 35
The argument lacks merit. In the first instance, an objection based on
charges of fortuity and preferential treatment is too general to carry much
weight. If a policyholder dealing directly with a company has paid only a
part of his premium and becomes a debtor to the company for the balance,
he will certainly not be held accountable for the uncollected unearned pre-
miums upon cancellation of his policy caused by the company's insolvency?'
Yet it is fortuitous that he had not remitted the balance before the company
became insolvent. Furthermore, the granting of a setoff will almost always
give the party enjoying it a preference over other creditors. This has not,
however, prevented it from being favored in bankruptcy. 37 Indeed, the very
reason for inserting section 68(a) in the Bankruptcy Act was to show the
propriety of allowing such preferences. 38
The major criticism of the dissent's objection to a setoff, however, is
that it completely ignores any interest which Manhattan might have had
in the insurance transactions. This oversight is difficult to explain, since it
was the dissent which pointed out that policyholders were being preferred
only because Manhattan set off the unearned premiums. It was stated that
Superior was involved in a business where the risks were high, i.e., insuring
young or "rated" drivers. In such a business the possibility of an insurance
company becoming insolvent is far from remote." In this context, it must
be noted that Manhattan had a recognized interest in protecting its own
good will and property right in the continued business of its customers. 4°
This interest would be seriously damaged if, upon Superior's insolvency, it
could not return to its policyholders the full unearned premiums. 44 Man-
hattan, therefore, had an interest in these insurance transactions just as real
as any policyholder.
With these considerations in mind, a denial of a setoff to Manhattan
would appear to be contradictory to the spirit of Section 68(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Setoffs are allowed in bankruptcy because it is deemed unjust
to compel a person who is both a debtor and creditor of the bankrupt to
35 Similar objections have been stated before. See Charles W. Virgin Ins. Agency,
v. Alabama Gen. Ins. Co., 114 So. 2d at 526; Clay v. Independence Mut. Ins. Co., 359
S.W.2d 679, 684 (Mo. 1962); Boblinger v. Ward & Co., 20 N.J. at 336-37, 120 A.2d at 4;
Bohlinger v. Zanger, 306 N.Y. at 241, 117 N.E.2d at 345.
28 See Boblinger v. Zanger, 306 N.Y. at 233, 117 N.E.2d at 340; 54 Colum. L.
Rev. 638, 639 (1954).
37 See, e.g., In re Pottier & Stymus Co., 262 F. 955, 956 (2d Cir. 1919); In re
W. & A. Bacon Co., 261 F. 109, 111 (D. Mass. 1919); Moore v. Joseph, 40 S.W.2d
948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
38 Moore v. Joseph, 40 S.W.2d 948 (Tex, Civ. App. 1931) ; 4 W. Collier, supra note
29, 	 68.02[1], at 713.
39 See Kimball, Denenberg & Bertrand, Rehabilitation and Liquidation of Insurance
Companies: Delinquency Proceedings in Insurance, 1967 Ins. L.J. 79.
40 See Bushnell v. Krafft, 133 Ind. App, at 485, 183 N.E.2d at 346.
41 Id.
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pay his debt to the bankrupt in full and to realize in return only a dividend? 2
It has already been concluded that Manhattan and Superior were debtor
and creditor and although the money Manhattan setoff was not its to keep,
it would seem equally unfair and unjust to require Manhattan to sacrifice
its own business interests and receive nothing in return.,
If, then, the propriety of allowing a setoff is to be finally governed by
equitable considerations, the result obtained from balancing the equities of
the unpreferred policyholders against those of Manhattan and the preferred
policyholders would seem to be that any advantage would rest on the side of
Manhattan and the preferred policyholders. Therefore, already having ob-
tained literal compliance with the setoff provision of the Bankruptcy Act,
there appears to be no substantial reason for disallowing Manhattan's setoff.
In conclusion, although it appears that the majority undeservedly em-
phasized the accounting setoff during the regular course of business, its final
decision was a correct one. The determination of the agent and insurer's rela-
tionship is the crucial issue in this kind of case. It is well established that a
finding of a trustee-beneficiary relationship forbids an agent's setoff. On the
other hand, since there is no substantial imbalance of equities to favor the
unpreferred policyholder, a finding of a debtor-creditor relationship should
give approval to such a setoff. As indicated, the business arrangement which
allowed Manhattan to deposit the premium collection in its own general
business account and which allowed Superior to look to Manhattan alone for
payment of the premiums in full seemed to clearly warrant the majority's
finding of a debtor-creditor relationship and, therefore, Manhattan's setoff
of the unearned premiums was properly sustained.
THOMAS R. MURTAGH
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 8(a) (3)—Em-
ployer Burden of Proof.—NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. 1—Great
Dane Trailers, Inc. '(hereinafter called Great Dane) and the Boilermakers'
Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement effective by its terms
until March 31, 1963. The agreement included a commitment by the company
to pay vacation benefits to employees who, in the preceding year, had worked
at least 1525 hours. The agreement also provided that, in the case of a "lay-
off, termination, or quitting," employees who had served more than 60 days
during the year would be entitled to pro rata shares of their vacation benefits.
This agreement was temporarily extended beyond its termination date. On
April 30, 1963, the union gave the required 15 days' notice of intention to
strike over issues still unsettled. Subsequently, on May 16, 1963, approxi-
mately 350 of the company's 400 employees commenced a strike which lasted
until December 26, 1963. During the strike the company continued to oper-
4 2 See In re Gravure Paper & Board Corp., 150 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D.N.J. 1957);
see also Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Nelson, 101 F.2d at 443.
1 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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